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Central Banking after the Crisis:  
Brave New World or Back to the Future? 




To what extent has the current financial crisis challenged the pre-crisis consensus on central 
banking? Has the crisis caused a paradigm shift in central banking or is it only a temporary 
alteration, which will be followed by a comeback of the pre-crisis ‘science’ of monetary 
policy? This paper provides a snapshot of the current state of central banking doctrine in the 
aftermath of the crisis, using data from a questionnaire produced in 2011 and sent to central 
bankers and economists for a report by the French Council of Economic Analysis to the Prime 
Minister. The results of our analysis of the replies to the questionnaire are twofold. First, we 
show that the financial crisis has led to some amendments of pre-crisis central banking. We 
highlight that respondents to the questionnaire agree on the general principle of a ‘broader’ 
view of central banking extended to financial stability. Nevertheless, central bankers and 
economists diverge or give inconsistent answers about the details of implementation of this 
‘broader’ view. Therefore, the devil is once again in the details. We point out that because of 
central bankers’ conservatism, a return to the status quo cannot be excluded. 
 
JEL Classification: E44, E52, G01, G18 
 







The current financial crisis has forced central bankers to be innovative, inevitably challenging 
pre-crisis central banking. The goal of this article is to evaluate to what extent pre-crisis 
central banking has been shattered, and to gauge its reform. To probe the debate around the 
evolving role of central banks, we used the questionnaire developed in the report ‘Central 
Banks and Financial Stability’ by the French Council of Economic Advisors to the Prime 
Minister (Betbèze et al., 2011)
1
. This international questionnaire was sent to 200 central 
bankers and economists from 16 countries around the world in February 2010. Answers were 
published in the report in April 2011 (all questions and answers are reported in the appendix 
giving details about the questionnaire). 
This type of survey has become commonplace. In the central banking literature, Cukierman 
(1992:386) and Cukierman et al. (1992) addressed a questionnaire to central bankers about 
central bank independence, a crucial question at the beginning of the 1990’s. Later, Blinder 
(2000) sent to both central bankers and economists a questionnaire about the topical question 
of the end of the 1990’s: ‘central-bank credibility’. De Haan and Waller (2004), De Haan et 
al. (2004) and De Haan et al. (2005) extended Blinder’s survey to the question of 
transparency, but their questionnaire was sent to economists only. The International Monetary 
                                                 
1 This report is available at http://www.cae.gouv.fr/Banques-centrales-et-stabilite-financiere,180.html 
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Fund regularly conducts questionnaires about specific concepts like transparency (IMF, 
2000). 
Central banks also routinely employ questionnaires. The European Central Bank (ECB) 
utilizes bank lending surveys, surveys on access to finance by SMEs, household and 
consumption surveys, and the ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters was launched in 1999 
to study expectations. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has carried out a similar 
survey of professional forecasters since 1990. The Fed also publishes a battery of surveys on 
the opinions of senior financial officers and senior loan officers on bank lending practices, 
terms of business lending and consumer finances. The Bank of England (BoE) has asked GfK 
NOP for questionnaires about the general public’s attitudes with respect to inflation and 
monetary policy since 1999. It has also conducted the questionnaire by Mahadeva and Sterne 
(2000), giving an accurate portrait of pre-crisis central banking, though it has been sent only 
to central bankers and mainly focuses on the policy framework.  
In the context of the current financial crisis, questionnaires deal with the new questions raised 
by central banking: how to encourage a more thorough interaction of central bankers and 
academics regarding monetary policy modeling (Bussière and Stracca, 2010), 
macroprudential policy (IMF, 2011) and stress tests (IMF, 2012). But these questionnaires are 
sent only to central bankers, and study only few narrow specific fields of central banking in 
depth.  
Our analysis of the questionnaire in this article contributes to the post-crisis central banking 
literature in three ways. First, following Blinder (2000), our questionnaire was sent to both 
central bankers and economists, contrary to most of the literature which usually only 
considers one of the two groups. Secondly, it extends previous literature that was narrowed 
down to specific aspects of central banking and so covers a large spectrum of central banking 
areas. Its 57 questions investigate six major aspects of central banking: 1) The Great 
Moderation and financial instability; 2) Central banking institutional design; 3) Financial 
stability; 4) Monetary policy (transmission channels, strategy, instruments); 5) The 
international dimension; 6) The economic science and art of central banking. Thirdly, our 
questionnaire has the advantage of giving a clear snapshot of the state of the art of central 
banking in the midst of a raging debate full of confusion. The questionnaire aims to tackle the 
following questions: what lessons of the crisis can be drawn for central bank policies 
(Cukierman, 2011)? Has the crisis caused a change in central banking? Up to the point of 
generating a new monetary policy paradigm? Or in accordance with folk wisdom, are central 
bankers characterized by significant conservatism? Are we back to the future as suggested by 
Masciandaro (2012)? Or on the contrary, are economists more reform-minded, with a greater 
preference for change? To answer these questions, we analyzed the questionnaire with two 
guidelines. First, we inspected convergences and divergences between central bankers and 
economists. The objective was to identify the post-crisis consensual and dissensual aspects of 
central banking, and more generally the aspects of central banking that will or will not be able 
to change after the current financial crisis is over. Secondly, we tracked inconsistencies in the 
answers of each category of respondent in order to spot the lack of consensus or clarity on the 
future of central banking.  
The answers to the questionnaire indicated some convergences of central bankers and 
economists on the idea that a large sector of central banking has been affected by the financial 
crisis. Part of the pre-crisis consensus has proven to be misleading or insufficient in the face 
of the crisis. In particular, the crisis has revealed the limits of the ‘narrow’ view of central 
banking, which mainly focused on price stability, and recommended ‘benign neglect’ 
regarding financial stability. Central banking is still alive and well though, with a flourishing 
number of new avenues of research. The questionnaire signalled some changes, with an 
evolution towards a ‘broader’ view of central banking. This new view has been enlarged to 
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give more room mainly to financial stability. However, on the basis of replies to the 
questionnaire, it is far from obvious that a paradigm shift in central banking is happening. The 
answers also stress some persistence of central banking doctrine. The questionnaire shows 
some divergences between economists and central bankers, who appear to be more 
conservative while economists have a stronger preference for change. Central bankers’ 
ambivalence – having a strong incentive to change due to the crisis, but still remaining 
attached to the pre-crisis consensus – surfaces with answers that are often inconsistent from 
one question to another. Despite the crisis, a status quo in central banking cannot be ruled out. 
In accordance with these mixed results, the rest of the article is organized as follows: based on 
respondents’ converging answers, section 2 highlights the aspects of ‘central banking 
orthodoxy challenged by the crisis’, and suggests possible future avenues for central banking 
reform. Tracking divergences and inconsistencies in respondents’ answers, section 3 points 
out a risk of ‘going back to the pre-crisis status quo’ in central banking. Section 4 provides a 
conclusion. 
2 Central banking orthodoxy challenged by the crisis 
 
According to a growing body of literature, the crisis has shaken the foundations of the pre-
crisis consensus on central banking (Goodhart, 2010b; Borio, 2011) and ‘poses serious 
challenges to the conventional, pre-crisis views and approaches of central banks and other 
financial supervisors’ (Bernanke, 2012). Our questionnaire offers complementary evidence 
and a more accurate portrayal of these challenges to central banking theory. The answers 
signal the first steps towards a paradigm shift to overcome pre-crisis central banking limits. In 
this section 2, we analyze these limits and the premises of changes in three key areas: 
macroeconomic environment, operational framework and institutional design of central 
banking.  
2.1 A not so ‘high-power’ central bank 
In the public opinion, the crisis has turned central banks into the key institutions to 
solve the crisis, while central bankers admit weakness in the face of financial instability. In 
sharp contrast, before the crisis, central banks were not so popular, despite central bankers’ 
and economists’ feeling powerful, confident that monetary policy had robust theoretical 
foundations and was becoming more and more a ‘science’ (Clarida et al., 1999). This 
contributed to the belief that monetary policy had become effective in stabilizing the 
economy. The answers to the questionnaire illustrate this belief: central bankers (57%) and 
academics (69%) remain convinced that monetary policy was one of the causes of the ‘Great 
Moderation’ (question 1.1). They seem to believe that monetary policy was effective enough 
to control its economic environment. However, the crisis has challenged the pre-crisis 
‘science’ and belief in the effectiveness of monetary policy.  
Incomplete ‘science’. Questionnaire answers provide some evidence that the financial 
crisis has created a structural breakdown, at least amongst economists, in the belief in the 
‘science’ of monetary policy: 55% of economists claim that the financial crisis has shown the 
failure of modern economic theory, while 56% declare that the financial crisis is also the 
crisis of economic theory (question 6.1.2). Indeed, central banking theory developed rapidly 
during the Great Moderation, but not in the area of financial stability, which was neglected. 
The Great Depression and the Japanese ‘lost decade’ were considered as exotic episodes that 
did not challenge the core of central banking. More generally, monetary and credit factors 
were peripheral in macroeconometric models. Despite claiming to be Neo-Wicksellian, New 
Keynesian models à la Woodford (2003) did not include the credit cycle and the related 
leverage cycle that were among the roots of the financial crisis. This explains why 89% of 
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central bankers and economists consider that central banks’ forecasting models should be 
supplemented by an analysis of monetary and financial conditions (sub-question 6.2.2). More 
radically, 59% of academics answer that DSGE models should be rejected (question 6.2.1). 
Benign financial instability? Central bankers and economists were convinced that 
price stability was a sufficient condition for financial stability, and if ever the latter had a 
spillover effect on the real economy, monetary policy would clean it up. Central bankers were 
supposed to control financial instability using little or no trade-off with price stability. 
Financial instability was considered as a second order issue, financial crisis being relegated to 
the thin tail of the probability distribution, and was supposed to have a limited and temporary 
impact on the real economy. This is in fact a leftover from the old dichotomy between the real 
economy and the financial economy. One of the underlying reasons for this view was the 
efficient market hypothesis. In this financial environment, the central bank has no strong 
reason to regulate financial instability since financial markets were supposed to converge to 
equilibrium. Endogenous financial instability was supposed to be moderate. This overly 
optimistic view explains why 91% of central bankers and academics admit that the Great 
Moderation led them to underestimate both financial risks taken at the micro-level by market 
participants and their macro implications for systemic risk (question 1.2). In the pre-crisis 
central banking theory, the procyclical effects of risk perceptions and attitudes towards risk 
were insufficiently integrated. As a result, a major mechanism of the financial crisis was left 
out. The questionnaire answers provide evidence that central bankers now pay more attention 
to financial instability. 
2.2 Shifts in the operational framework 
The financial crisis has shed light on the limits of the pre-crisis consensus on the monetary 
policy ‘strategy’ of inflation targeting. Questionnaire answers give some indications of a 
change towards a ‘broader’ view of central banking in dealing with financial stability. 92% of 
central bankers and 91% of economists do think that the crisis has changed both the goals and 
instruments of monetary policy (question 2.1).  
2.2.1 Goals and targets 
Broadened mandate: back to the past. As seen in section 2.1, questionnaire answers 
indicate that during the Great Moderation too much focus on price stability led to insufficient 
attention to financial stability and systemic risk. The literature was in fact recommending a 
hierarchical, lexicographic or unique mandate with priority to price stability. In formal terms, 
the weight of the goal of financial stability in the central bank loss function was close to zero. 
This mandate was a sign of historical short-sightedness. It neglected the fact that financial 
stability is a historical goal for central banking as illustrated by the original mandate of the 
Fed - created in 1913 to prevent financial instability - as well as by lessons from the ‘Great 
Depression’. Such lack of foresight has been reduced since the crisis: 86% of central bankers 
and 73% of academics consider that the goal of price stability should be complemented by 
one of financial stability (question 2.2).  
No ‘divine coincidence’. Moreover, 54% of central bankers and 56% of economists 
consider that more power should be given to central banks to make them able to secure both 
monetary and financial stability (question 3.5.1). These answers implicitly mean that, contrary 
to the pre-crisis consensus, there is no ‘divine coincidence’. Price stability is not enough to 
ensure financial stability; price stability is a necessary but not sufficient condition. De facto, 
mandates have been enlarged to include financial stability, notably at the Bank of England, 
and central banks put more emphasis on financial stability on their websites. The absolute 
priority of price stability seems to be questioned; the mandate of central banks needs to be 
broadened. The increased responsibility of the Bank of England regarding financial stability 
in the 2009 Banking Act is a good example of an institution which has always been seen as a 
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model of institutional design. The ‘broader’ view of central banking requires the role of 
central banks to be significantly enlarged. In formal terms, the central bank loss function is 
augmented from a financial stability argument, a ‘financial gap’.  
Limits to targeting strategies. The crisis has also revealed the limits of the pre-crisis 
strategies used to deal with financial instability, mainly indirectly, by adjusting the 
operational definition of the goal of price stability. A popular strategy of adapting inflation 
targeting to financial crisis and the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate was 
to define price stability in terms of price level rather than inflation (Eggertsson and Woodford, 
2003). Price level targeting has not been practiced during the current financial crisis; in fact, 
85% of central bankers and 54% of economists consider it should not be preferred to inflation 
targeting (question 4.2.2). 
2.2.2 Instruments 
The ‘clean-up afterwards’ and the separation principles questioned. The so called 
‘Jackson Hole consensus’, ‘benign neglect’ vis-à-vis financial instability also seem to be 
questioned. These strategies consist in using the interest during the financial bust to ‘mop-up’ 
but not during the boom, i.e. ‘clean up afterwards’ (CUA), as stressed by Mishkin (2011a). 
This view has now changed, according to the answers to the questionnaire. 85% of central 
bankers and 88% of academics consider that low interest rates were too low, due to the 
absence of response to the risk of financial instability, and that this could have caused the 
crisis (question 1.5). A majority of them recognize that low interest rates also lead to a risk of 
excessive asset price increases (question 4.3.2). In formal terms, the interest rate rule can no 
longer permanently have a zero response coefficient on financial stability (Bask, 2012). The 
Taylor rule should be augmented with financial stability, as underscored by answers to 
question 4.4.1: 77% of central bankers and 57% of academics consider that the policy rate 
should react to credit and asset bubbles. In the end, the crisis may have changed views on the 
integration of asset prices in the monetary policy strategy, going from the domination of the 
CUA strategy to the rehabilitation of the ‘leaning against the wind’ (LAW) strategy defended 
initially by the Bank of International Settlements (Cecchetti et al., 2000; 2002). 
More generally, the current crisis also provided a test of the ‘separation principle’ underlying 
the CUA. According to this principle, the European Central Bank (ECB) claimed that, due to 
the separation of the two goals of price and financial stability, separate instruments should be 
used for each goal. In this view, the interest rate should not target financial stability, which 
should be regulated by prudential policies. The current financial crisis has shown that the 
action of the lender of last resort is not necessarily enough to fight financial instability if it is 
large and persistent - a scenario that was not envisaged in the pre-crisis consensus. Interest 
rate actions are also required to contain financial stability, as illustrated by the severe interest 
rate cuts by the Fed during the current crisis. The separation principle seems to be questioned, 
since 64% of central bankers and 59% of academics estimate that financial stability involves 
both monetary policy and prudential supervision (question 3.1.1) 
New instruments required for financial stability. Questionnaire answers indicate that 
for most economists and central bankers the financial crisis has led to changes with respect to 
the goals and instruments of monetary policy (question 2.1). First, because during the crisis 
the interest rate instrument was aimed not only at price stability, but also at financial stability. 
With one instrument for two goals, the standard Tinbergen principle is not complied with. A 
new instrument is required for the goal of financial stability. The second reason is that the 
interest rate instrument was not sufficient to cope with financial instability, since the zero 
lower bound was quickly reached. This fact was recognized by 75% of central bankers and 
53% of economists, who consider that interest rate is not the most efficient tool to ensure 
financial stability (question 4.4.3). Evidence of this limitation on the interest rate is the 
massive use of unconventional monetary policies during the crisis. In this respect, central 
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bankers have been uncommonly innovative, far from Rogoff’s view of conservative central 
bankers. The Mundell assignment principle recommends using prudential instruments to 
achieve the goal of financial stability. This leads to the last reason: central bankers are now 
ready to be strongly involved in prudential policy and need instruments in this area. 
According to answers given to the questionnaire, 62% of central bankers and 66% of 
academics declared that the central bank should go beyond providing liquidity every day and 
playing the role of lender of last resort. It should be involved in micro-prudential supervision 
(question 3.2.1). These answers suggest that central banks were insufficiently connected to the 
authorities in charge of banking and financial stability, as was the case in the dominant British 
model in which the Financial Stability Authority (FSA) was independent of the central bank 
(Masciandaro et al., 2012).  
From micro-prudential to macro-prudential supervision. The traditional micro-
prudential tool is challenged by a post-crisis consensus calling for supervision to be enlarged 
to a macro-prudential perspective (De Haan et al., 2012). According to 86% of central bankers 
and by 89% of economists the central bank should play an important role in macro-prudential 
policy (question 3.3.1), in accordance with the emerging consensus in the academic literature 
(Blinder, 2010; Masciandaro, 2012). 73% of central bankers and 80% of economists support 
the new responsibility given to the ECB in macro-prudential policy (question 3.6.2). This new 
view is consistent with an increasing part of the literature that proposes that central banks 
should play a key role in this area
2
. It is also consistent with reality, since central banks 
became key actors in macro-prudential policy by virtue of their acute knowledge of the 
financial system. The new macro-prudential approach should consist in more thorough 
supervision of systemic institutions according to 86% of central bankers and 77% of 
academics (question 3.5.2). The emerging role of macro-prudential supervision does not mean 
that the micro-prudential dimension has been abandoned - these policies are complementary. 
However, 54% of central bankers and 62% of academics consider that banks’ stress tests are 
not the best way to move towards a convergence of micro-prudential and macro-prudential 
regulation (question 3.4.1). 
2.2.3 Transmission channels 
According to questionnaire answers, there is a consensus that (financial, systemic) risks 
were underestimated during the Great Moderation (question 1.2). Consequently, the link 
between low interest rate policies (question 1.5) and systemic risk was neglected. The impact 
of accommodating monetary policies on the risk aversion of financial market participants was 
not taken into account. Of second magnitude before the crisis, the ‘risk-taking channel’ (Borio 
and Zhu, 2012) is now considered as one of the main monetary policy transmission channels 
by 54% of central bankers and 63% of academics (question 4.1.2). This channel means that 
low interest rate policies can give market participants an incentive to take more risk – i.e. 
Keynes’ optimistic animal spirits - thereby increasing the probability of a systemic risk. It is 
now commonly admitted that low interest rate policies can contribute to credit and financial 
booms. The ‘risk-taking channel’ is consistent with the new ‘broader’ view of central banking 
that emphasizes the central banks’ natural responsibility for financial stability.  
This new transmission channel is renewing the interest for the theoretical framework 
developed by Keynes, and Minsky (1986). The risk-taking channel has resurrected 
phenomena theorized by Minsky (Goodhart, 2010a), such as the ‘financial fragility’ 
hypothesis, ‘the paradox of tranquillity’ and ‘Minsky moment’. These hypotheses have been 
more recently developed at the Bank of International Settlement as the ‘paradox of credibility’ 
of monetary policy (Borio and Lowe, 2002).  
                                                 
2Bank of England (2009), de Larosière (2009). 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.73
7 
 
2.3 Central banking institutional design 
As we have seen in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the financial crisis has challenged the standard 
monetary policy theory and strategy. There is also a debate about the reform of the pre-crisis 
central banking institutional framework (see Masciandaro et al., 2012). Questionnaire answers 
provide some useful information on this matter. 
Monetary and financial authorities: should they be separated? Before the crisis, a 
principle of separation was largely applied, causing a decoupling of the responsibilities for 
price stability and financial stability. In this framework, monetary policy focuses on price 
stability, while financial stability does not need to be one of the central bank’s tasks (Blinder, 
2010). The result could be two separate institutions, one for each goal, as in the United 
Kingdom where responsibility for price stability was given to the Bank of England, while that 
for financial stability was given to the FSA. According to our questionnaire, only 31% of 
central bankers and 27% of economists maintain the doctrine of fully separate institutions 
after the crisis, while respectively 54% and 69% of them recommend some cooperation 
between the monetary authorities and prudential supervisors (question 2.4). The creation in 
December 2010 of the European Systemic Risk Board chaired by the European Central Bank 
- which includes European prudential authorities, as well as representatives of the EU 
commission - was approved by 60% of central bankers and 75% of economists (question 
3.3.2). Since the separation principle has been questioned, the separation of the two goals of 
price stability and financial instability into two separate institutions is challenged. Authorities 
in charge of price and financial stability need to cooperate.  
Institutionalizing global central banking coordination. During the last decade, 
because price stability was seen as a sufficient condition for macroeconomic stability and 
efficient markets were supposed to generate little negative international spillover, national 
macroeconomic stability was also seen as a sufficient condition for international 
macroeconomic stability. This could be regarded as the triumph of the ‘own house in order’ 
doctrine in the international monetary field. 
On the contrary, the financial crisis has shown the international dimension of central 
banking and prompted new forms of international cooperation among central banks, in 
particular to provide liquidity to banks, restore confidence in financial markets and play the 
role of lender of last resort. Examples of such cooperation are provided by the coordinated 
actions of six central banks in cutting down their interest rates on October 8, 2008 just after 
the Lehman Brothers collapse, along with the liquidity swap lines initiated in December 2007 
by the Fed for several central banks.  
The case for coordination of actions as lenders of last resort generally comes from the 
openness of our economies and the high interconnectedness of financial institutions (Chan-
Lau et al., 2012). In a highly globalized world, in which markets are tightly integrated, 
country- or regional-specific monetary policies are bound to be inadequate. The financial 
stability policy (liquidity injection) in one country can have spillover effects in other 
countries. As global financial markets are highly interdependent, liquidity and financial 
stability become a global common good, and new forms of implicit international lenders of 
last resort are required. The existence of domino effects and all the subsequent ‘spillover’ 
effects are well accepted.  The consensus on this international coordination is large: 82% of 
central bankers and 62% of economists think that major central banks should take into 
account the impact of their action on world liquidity (question 5.2). On top of that, 92% of 
central bankers and 80% of economists consider that central bank operations as lenders of last 
resort need to be coordinated (question 5.5). 
The case for coordination of action to tackle financial bubbles is identical: because of the 
openness of our economies and the tight interconnections between financial institutions, if a 
central bank chooses to use macro-prudential tools in order to limit credit developments 
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among other things, financial intermediaries can substitute external funding for domestic 
funding. Accordingly, without coordination macro-prudential policy may not be efficient. 
This is the reason why some economists have asked for the creation of an International 
Monetary Policy Committee (Eichengreen et al., 2011), among other proposals. Analytically, 
this calls for a shift to a ‘broader view’ equivalent to that which has already occurred in bank 
supervision, from a micro- to a macro-prudential perspective, towards a more global approach 
to monetary policy. Questionnaire answers give evidence of such a change:  50% of central 
bankers and 60% of economists (question 5.4) consider that central banks should lean against 
the wind of financial bubbles in a coordinated way.  
Central bank independence revisited. The ‘broader’ view of central banking 
highlighted in the questionnaire promotes more goals, increased responsibility and power to 
the central banks, particularly in the domain of financial stability. As a result, the question of 
central bank independence should be raised not only with respect to politicians, but also with 
respect to financial players. Some authors (see Blinder, 1997) have pointed out that 
institutional design should organize the independence of central banks vis-à-vis financial 
markets. This idea is widely supported in the answers to our questionnaire. According to 85% 
of central bankers and 75% of economists, central bank autonomy is as important for financial 
stability as it is for price stability (sub-question 2.3).  
But from the institutional and political economy viewpoints, this greater role and power given 
to central banks must lead to an increase in central bankers’ accountability with respect to 
elected bodies and civil society. The institutional design theory for price stability - based on 
the principal-agent approach à la Walsh (1995) and calling for a credible incentive structure 
of accountability - should also prevail for financial stability. From the political economy point 
of view, the trade-off between central bank independence and accountability calls for a new 
balance between independence and accountability to alleviate the democratic deficit and 
secure the democratic legitimacy of the central bank’s role in financial stability.  
3 Going back to the pre-crisis status quo? 
 
As seen in section 2, the financial crisis has challenged pre-crisis central banking orthodoxy. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that central banking foundations will be renewed. 
Answers given to the questionnaire provide evidence that there is a convergence of opinions 
towards a consensus on the general principle of putting more emphasis on financial stability. 
As usual though, the devil is in the details. There are also many divergences of opinion about 
the implementation of this increased focus on financial stability. Divergences appear with 
contrasted answers from central bankers and economists. Moreover, answers given by both 
types of respondents (central bankers and economists) are not always consistent from one 
question to another. Based on the study of these inconsistencies in their answers, this section 3 
shows that the status quo is likely to prevail in the doctrine of central banking. 
3.1 Sticky theoretical foundations  
3.1.1 Central bankers 
During the ‘Great Moderation’, central bankers believed they could be complacent about 
financial instability (Mishkin, 2011b:30). As seen in section 2.1, they now admit that this 
stable macroeconomic environment had caused them to underestimate financial risks. Since 
they claim the ‘Great Moderation’ is over, they should consider that we are now in a time of 
greater volatility and therefore pay more attention to financial stability. Paradoxically 
however, only 38% of them consider that we are entering an era of financial instability 
(question 1.3). Does this mean that central bankers see the ongoing financial crisis as an 
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exogenous and temporary shock alone, in contrast to endogenous financial instability à la 
Minsky? Without drawing hasty conclusions, this casts doubt on how important they believe 
the financial instability they will have to face, and thus on their willingness to openly address 
the issue. 
3.1.2 Economists 
As seen in section 2.1, economists are prompt to highlight the weakness of modern economic 
science. When asked if the efficient markets framework should be jettisoned (question 6.3.2) 
a majority of the economists (52%) said yes. Accordingly, they should reject the main 
economic hypothesis of rational expectations. However, a majority (55%) of them disagree 
that the latter should be replaced by the animal spirits assumption (question 6.3.1). 
Economists are not necessarily inconsistent, but instead probably believe that the alternative 
theoretical framework is not well developed enough to replace the old one.   
3.1.3 Economists versus Central Bankers 
Our analysis shows that central bankers’ and economists’ views on the renewal of central 
banking theory are slightly different. Central bankers are closely bound to the pre-crisis 
mainstream theory, while economists are more critical about the mainstream theory even if 
they do not give strong support to alternative theories. This leads to a paradox in answers to 
the questionnaire: central bankers are more prompt to defend existing economic ‘science’ than 
economists themselves! 
Absolutely all central bankers refuse the idea that the financial crisis is due to the failure of 
modern macroeconomics (question 6.1.2). They also reject the idea that the economic crisis is 
a crisis of economic theory (sub-question 6.1.2), contrary to a majority of economists. 
Similarly, when asked if the DSGE class of models used by central banks and economists are 
fundamentally flawed, 82% of central bankers answer that DSGE models are useful, a 
conclusion on which only 36% of economists agree (question 6.2.1).  
Last, to the question ‘do you think central banking will continue to be more an art than a 
science?’ (question 6.4.2), a large majority (70 %) of central bankers consider that central 
banking will remain an art helped by science
3
. Meanwhile, 60% of economists believe that 
central banking will definitely be an art. Here again, it seems that central bankers are more 
prompt than economists to defend the usefulness of the mainstream theory in conducting 
monetary policy.  
The central bankers’ commitment to the theory may surprise more than one. However many 
central bankers not only come from academia but participate in the science. Theory is a 
crucial ingredient of their communication. Since central bankers are independent, the theory 
offers them a way of justifying decisions and actions which is necessary to build their 
legitimacy. Consequently, any theoretical change would be costly in terms of communication 
and credibility. Nonetheless, central bankers have been very innovative since the beginning of 
the crisis, much more than theoreticians. 
3.2 Persistence of the pre-crisis strategy 
General strategy. For most respondents, the crisis has changed the views of central 
bankers and academics with respect to the goals and instruments of monetary policy. 
Inconsistently though, 83% of central bankers want to keep their inflation-targeting strategy 
unchanged (question 4.2.1). In sharp contrast, 79% of economists call for change and thus are 
more consistent – or less conservative - than central bankers in their answers. Another sign of 
conservatism about inflation targeting is the consensus on keeping the level of the inflation 
                                                 
3Answers range from central banking will be “banked by scientific temperament” to central banking will be 
“based on science”. 
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target unchanged. Indeed the Blanchard et al. (2010) proposal of increasing the inflation target 
from to 2 to 4% to address the problem of financial instability was rejected by 86% of central 
bankers and 55% of academics (sub-question 4.1.1).  
Dealing with financial stability. How to explain that even forced by the financial crisis to 
focus more on financial stability, central bankers have kept inflation targeting and the 
financial stability management principles that go with it (Jackson Hole consensus, CUA, 
etc.)? A possible reason why central bankers continue to favour the ‘clean’ strategy is that 
62% of them claim they do not create moral hazard when they play their role of Lender of 
Last Resort by helping systemically-important institutions (question 3.5.3). 60% of the 
economists hold the opposite view, as they indicate their preference for the competing LAW 
strategy (see question 4.4.3). 
One consequence of these contradictory views is inconsistent answers from central bankers 
about, for instance, the danger of an overly accommodating monetary policy for financial 
stability. On the one hand, (in section 2, questions 1.5, 4.4.1 and 4.4.2) they agree that low 
interest rates may cause a bubble and so would be inclined to avoid it. On the other hand, 
central bankers hesitate when asked (question 4.4.2) whether a central bank should always 
choose the lowest interest rate consistent with its definition of price stability, or rather choose 
a higher rate in the presence of a bubble? 80% say yes to the first part of the question and 
surprisingly 80% also say yes to the second part. It is surprising that the majority of central 
bankers answered "yes" to both. If we assume that the issue has not been misunderstood, then 
it shows a great degree of confusion regarding the monetary policy strategy to achieve 
financial stability. This can be interpreted as a double language, sometimes recognising the 
failure of previous strategies (separation principle, CUA), sometimes not. More generally, 
these ambiguous answers may be interpreted as a sign of the lack of willingness to take 
financial stability into account. 
Are the financial stability goal and channels still neglected? Despite the crisis, the 
financial stability goal seems to remain a second order question. Even if at first central 
bankers (like economists) approve of the financial stability goal as a complement of the 
monetary stability goal (question 2.2), 62% of central bankers (compared to 48% of the 
economists) answer that if they aim at both monetary and financial stability, monetary policy 
will be endangered (sub-question 3.5.1). 
Regarding transmission channels, central bankers again give inconsistent answers, which 
suggest they neglect the risk-taking channel. 54% of them admit the importance of the risk-
taking channel (question 4.1.2), but in answers given to other questions (see above question 
4.4.2), they implicitly reveal that they do not take into account the implications of the risk-
taking channel for interest rate policy.  
Unconventional policies. Central bankers are also ambiguous in their assessment of 
unconventional monetary policies. They are only 29% (compared to 62% of economists) in 
saying these policies solve the ‘zero bound’ issue (question 4.3.1). This seems to be 
paradoxical at first glance, since central bankers have in practice used extensively 
unconventional policies since the beginning of the crisis. There are at least two possible 
interpretations of such a paradox. First, central bankers could have realized that these policies 
are not enough to overcome the ZLB problem. Second, as they judge the financial shock to be 
temporary, they see these policies as temporary and do not want to rely on them in their 
communication. They will therefore soon be back to conventional policies to regulate 
financial instability. As for economists, they seem more optimistic about unconventional 
policies, probably because they have theorized them and because they could consider, not 
without reason, that central bankers have in fact followed their recommendations.  
Moreover, 50% of central bankers consider that unconventional policies pose a risk to price 
stability (compared to 31% of economists) in the medium/long run (question 4.3.3). This view 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.73
11 
 
is not fully consistent with the facts; there is no empirical evidence yet that unconventional 
policies have generated – or will generate - hyperinflation. However, this view is consistent 
with the hypothesis that central bankers believe these policies should be temporary. 
3.3 No consensus on the optimal institutional design  
As pointed out in section 2 and in sharp contrast with the pre-crisis consensus, both central 
bankers and economists now seem in favor of a greater involvement of central banks in both 
macro- and micro-prudential supervision (questions 3.3.1 and 3.2.1). In light of these replies, 
the institutional separation between micro- and macro-regulation agencies does not appear to 
be the preferred institutional design. Only 42% of central bankers and 46% of economists 
approve of central banks being in charge of systemic oversight, while specialized agencies 
deal with institution-specific supervision (question 3.4.2). In contrast, the opposite 
institutional design, i.e., the two prudential policies (micro and macro) under the same roof of 
the central bank, is not the new consensus either. Only a third of central bankers and 
economists are in favour of a single agency for prudential policy (question 3.4.2). Note also 
that the abstention rate of central bankers (25%) for this last question is among the highest. 
Abstention was also very high for question 3.6.2 (‘Is it a good thing that the ECB has been 
granted macro-prudential supervisory prerogatives?’), even though the majority of central 
bankers and economists answered yes. The optimal post-crisis macro-prudential institutional 
design still appears to be unclear as also stressed in the literature (Cukierman, 2011). This 
blurred vision of central banking design in the area of the financial stability highlights deep 
questions raised in the literature: the fear of concentrating too much powers in the hands of 
the central bank (Buiter, 2012); the persistent doubt about the central bank ability to assume a 
micro-prudential mission (Eijffinger and Masciandaro, 2011; Boyer and Ponce, 2011); the 
difficulty for the central bank to preserve its independence in assuming a financial stability 
mission because of the highly political nature ofthe latter (Blinder, 2012). 
Additional proof of this lack of clear vision is that, although central bankers seem to subscribe 
to a greater involvement in prudential activities, they are only a small majority (55%) that 
‘believe that the countries where the central bank is involved in prudential oversight fared 
better during the crisis’ (question 3.2.3). Only 32% of economists gave an affirmative answer 
to this question. The answer appears to be contradictory to the economists’ position of 
recommending greater involvement of central banks in supervision (question 3.2.1), while 
admitting it does not necessarily work in practice.  
At the European level, a majority of answers agree with the need for a new supervisory 
framework in Europe to deal with risks of financial stability as well as monitoring individual 
banks (question 3.6.1). However, only 40% of the answers saw the European System of 
Financial Supervision (ESFS) as a ‘first best’ solution (question 3.6.3). The ESFS, proposed 
in 2010, is comprised of an EU-wide body to look for systemic risk and a second body to 
examine individual companies – including national regulators and three EU regulators for the 
securities, banking and insurance-and-pension sectors. In other words, there is no consensus 
about the optimal European model of supervision.  
3.4 International cooperation: only in times of crisis? 
At the start of the financial crisis, monetary authorities implemented innovative 
unconventional policies and, as seen in section 2, there are some signs of change for more 
international cooperation among central banks. Yet in the details, central banks still seem 
unclear about exactly how they will deal with the international consequences (positive and 
negative externalities) of unconventional policies and with the goal of financial stability. The 
old ‘own house in order’ doctrine may prevail in the future.  
The wide agreement on the idea that major central banks should take into account the impact 
of their decisions on global liquidity, stressed in section 2 (question 5.2), should logically be 
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accompanied by a broad consensus on the risk of negative externalities caused by 
unconventional policies. This does not seem to be really the case though. On one hand, 52% 
of economists believe that there is a risk of mutual inconsistency in national approaches, but 
on the other hand, 83% of central bankers deny this problem (question 5.1). Then when asked 
if monetary chaos is a risk (sub-question 5.1), the same 52% of economists give an 
affirmative answer, while once again a large majority of central bankers (75%) consider that 
there is no risk. Finally, to the question ‘Should major central banks coordinate their action as 
lenders of last resort?’ (question 5.5), almost all central bankers (92%) give an affirmative 
answer. When asked the same question about tackling asset price bubbles (question 5.4), only 
one central banker out of two considers coordination to be a better solution.  
These answers cast doubt about central bankers’ willingness to take the international scope of 
their decisions into account, and indicate a free riding behavior problem. Nevertheless, this 
seems consistent with central bankers’ view that financial instability and unconventional 
policies are temporary. 
Question 5.3 about exchange rates gives another illustration of central bankers’ preference for 
the status quo, rather than going further in international coordination. To the question ‘In 
what circumstances are coordinated interventions by major central banks on the forex market 
desirable’, a large majority of central bankers and economists answer that they are but only in 
the case of extreme events (78% and 61% respectively). Last, only 17% of economists answer 
that interventions should take place regularly, while none of the central bankers agree. Notice 
that laissez-faire (floating exchange rate) was well accepted before the crisis, while regular 
interventions were seen as non standard policy even if many countries did in fact intervene on 
the forex market due to the ‘fear of floating’. On the one hand, the widespread answers of 
economists illustrate the intensity of the debate among central bankers. On the other hand, the 
zero vote by central bankers indicates some taboos and their preference for the consensual 
answer. This can be seen as a conservative bias. 
4 Conclusion 
As often, the devil is in the details. Economists and central bankers answering to our 
questionnaire agree on a new broad principle for central banking: more attention to financial 
stability. There are some signals of such a move from a narrow to a broader view of central 
banking. But respondents disagree about details of implementation of the reform: which 
goals, which instruments, which institutions… Answers about how to reform the central 
banking show some divergences, and often even some inconsistencies, in respondents’ views 
of the future of central banking.  
Several of these inconsistencies are worth mentioning since they constitute the currently 
unsolved questions that could rank at the top of the agenda of future research on central 
banking.  
As an initial illustration of these discrepancies, economists and central bankers see low 
interest rates as a factor in the housing bubble, but remain convinced that a central bank must 
choose the lowest interest rate consistent with its definition of price stability and should not 
choose a higher rate in the presence of a bubble. Another example is that economists and 
central bankers admit that the financial crisis has changed central banks’ goals and 
instruments and that the price stability objective must be complemented by a financial 
stability objective. At the same time though, a large majority of central bankers remain 
opposed to a change in the quantitative definition of price stability (in contrast, more than half 
of economists would be favourable) and very hostile to a revision of the inflation-targeting 
strategy (once again, unlike a large majority of economists, who would be in favour of it). The 
lesson that can be drawn is that central bankers have no clear preferences, and differ from 
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economists, on the future monetary policy strategy (conduct and choice of the instrument) 
enlarged to financial stability.  
As additional inconsistency, central bankers and economists are convinced that central banks 
should be involved in prudential supervision, but without distinction between micro- and 
macro-prudential supervision. This leads to a rather confused picture of who is in charge of 
supervision and how the central bank should be involved (micro- and/or macro- prudential 
involvement). The lesson is that central bankers and economists have no clear view on the 
institutional design of a new central banking enlarged to financial stability. 
As a consequence, the wind of change maybe will not blow strong enough to overthrow the 
pre-crisis central banking. There is an obvious risk of status quo in central banking theory and 
practice. In the near future, we could see the persistence of the inflation targeting mainstream 
in which financial stability is a simple contribution of central bankers, not a goal per se.  
The scenario of the status quo in central banking seems plausible as central bankers’ answers 
exhibit a more ‘conservative’ bias than those of economists. This conservatism could explain 
the striking result of the questionnaire of recurrent inconsistencies in central bankers’ 
answers, notably in the domain of financial stability. To be more precise, these 
inconsistencies could stem from two opposite forces: change versus conservatism. First, as 
central bankers want more power, they agree to be vested with a mission of financial stability. 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that they need to be involved in financial stability because 
they realized during the crisis that, contrary to their pre-crisis opinion base, price stability and 
monetary policy did not in practice have the positive effect they expected on financial 
stability. This would be the brave new world of central bankers. As an opposite force, they are 
attached to the pre-crisis theories where financial stability was a second order question - 
theories that were the foundations of their credibility and legitimacy. This force is an 
incentive for central bankers to consider financial stability as a temporary issue confined to 
exceptional and abnormal periods and calls for a return to pre-crisis principles. Central 
bankers’ conservatism is an expected result from the literature (Rogoff, 1985); in particular 
during crisis because central bankers are cautious in the face of uncertainty (Brainard, 1967). 
In economists’ replies they appear to be less conservative than central bankers. However, they 
do not seem reformists enough to avoid the status quo and impose a paradigm shift in central 
banking. Economists also are not fully consistent; they recognise the flaws of economic 
theory, but few are ready to replace the hypothesis of rational expectations by that of animal 
spirits and only a small majority agrees to abandon the theory of efficient markets. 
Economists may sail less on the wind of reform than the wind of doubt, as emphasized by 
their pessimism about the usefulness of their science for central banking: 60% of them 
estimate that central banking will continue to be an art and only an art, not a science. A last 
lesson of the analysis of the questionnaire is that the new financial stability oriented central 
banking needs for theoretical foundations. The ‘science’ of central banking remains to be 
reinvented. 
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The questionnaire was sent to around 200 recipients: economists, central bankers and 
supervisors. Economists are academics that have been chosen as well known and famous 
experts working specifically on monetary policy or financial stability. This choice is close to 
Blinder (2000) selecting ‘academic economists who specialize in monetary economics or 
macroeconomics’ and comparing central bankers’ and academics’ views, as a good way to 
take the measure of the distance between the ‘art’ and ‘science’ of central banking.  
The rate of return was about 25% with 46 respondents from around the world (a total of 16 
countries plus the euro zone represented by the European Central Bank). Among the 46 
respondents, 31 are economists and 15 are central bankers (responding supervisors were too 
few to form a separate category of participants). Central bankers were naturally well 
distributed among the 16 countries because a person generally responded on behalf of their 
institution (except for two in Japan). French (12), American (10) and British (4) economists 
are the most represented among questionnaire participants (table 1). 
 
Table 1: Distribution of respondents by categories (central bankers /economists) and by countries 
 All Central bankers Economists 
 Number % Number % Number % 
Australia 2 4 1 7 1 3 
Canada 1 2 0 0 1 3 
China 1 2 1 7 0 0 
Czech Republic 1 2 1 7 0 0 
Euro Area 1 2 1 7 0 0 
France 13 28 1 7 12 39 
Germany 1 2 1 7 0 0 
India 1 2 1 7 0 0 
Israel 1 2 0 0 1 3 
Italia 2 4 1 7 1 3 
Japan 2 4 2 13 0 0 
Korea 1 2 1 7 0 0 
Mexico 2 4 1 7 1 3 
Sweden 1 2 1 7 0 0 
Turkey 1 2 1 7 0 0 
United Kingdom 5 11 1 7 4 13 
United States 10 22 0 0 10 32 
Total 46 100 15 100 31 100 
 
The representativeness of the sample may be questioned since 61% of interviewed people 
come from only 3 countries: United States, France and United Kingdom. In the details, the 
problem of representativeness is less pregnant for central bankers than for economists. The 
distribution of central bankers is more balanced across countries since one person is generally 
responding on the behalf of the institution (except two in the case of Japan). For economists, 
one can hope that the diversity of opinion among them should mitigate the country bias. 
A last concern on questionnaire expressed in the literature is that central bankers’ responses to 
the questionnaire are ‘subjective’ and even can be biased. Central bankers may do not respond 
what they personally think, but give an official view representative of the central bank. Or 
they may also respond what is expected from them, not what they really think (Cukierman et 
al., 1992). For these reasons, some authors prefer to rely on their own independent analysis 
instead of information provided by central bankers via questionnaires. But our questionnaire 
has the major advantage of dealing with areas of central banking where information cannot be 
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1. Financial instability and the ‘Great moderation’ 
1.1. Did the "Great Moderation" reflect improved monetary policy? 
Structural factors? Both? Neither (was the "Great Moderation" 
an illusion?) 
 Only improved monetary policy 7 14 3  Only structural factors 14 21 10  Both 65 57 69  An illusion 12 7 14  N/A 2 0 3 
Number of participants 43 14 29 
1.2. Did the "Great Moderation" contribute to misperceptions about 
risks? 
 Yes 91 91 91  No 9 9 9  N/A 0 0 0 
Number of participants 33 11 22 
1.3. Is the "Great Moderation" over?  Yes 56 54 57  No 39 38 39  N/A 6 8 4 
Number of participants 36 13 23 
1.4. Are we entering an era of amplified credit cycles and financial 
instability? 
 Yes 60 38 70  No 38 54 30  N/A 3 8 0 
Number of participants 40 13 27 
1.5. Were unusually low interest rates a factor in the housing bubble 
and therefore ultimately the bust? 
 Yes 87 85 88  No 13 15 12  N/A 0 0 0 
Number of participants 38 13 25 
2. Institutional Design 
2.1. Has the crisis changed both central banks' tasks and their toolkit?  Yes 92 92 91  No 8 8 9  N/A 0 0 0 
Number of participants 36 13 23 
2.2. Should the central bank’s price stability objective be 
complemented by a financial stability objective?   
 Yes 78 86 73  No 20 14 23  N/A 3 0 4 
Number of participants 40 14 26 
2.3. Do you think that the central banks’ ability to take actions to 
assure price stability while sustaining economic prosperity depends 
heavily on their independence from political pressure?  
 Yes 83 92 78  No 17 8 22  N/A 0 0 0 
Number of participants 36 13 23 
Do you think that said independence would be of equal importance for 
central banks with a financial stability objective? 
 Yes 79 85 75  No 18 8 25  N/A 3 8 0 
Number of participants 33 13 20 
2.4. Should monetary authority and supervisory roles be separated or 
does cooperation create beneficial synergies? 
 Separation 28 31 27  Cooperation 64 54 69  N/A 8 15 4 
Number of participants 39 13 26 
3. Financial Stability 
3.1. Financial stability goal 
3.1.1. Do you believe that the goal of financial stability is part of 
prudential supervision or of both prudential supervision and monetary 
policy? 
 Of both 61 64 59  Only of prudential supervision 37 36 37  N/A 2 0 4 
Number of participants 41 14 27 
3.1.2. Would you characterize the measures to be taken to stabilize the 
financial markets as mostly concerned with prudential supervision? 
Mostly concerned with monetary policy? Both at the same time? A 
stronger linkage between the two? 
 Mostly concerned with prudential supervision 18 4 14  Mostly concerned with monetary policy 9 2 7  Concerned by both 20 9 11  A stronger linkage between the two 10 4 6  N/A 7 1 6 
Number of participants 39 13 26 
3.2. Microprudential supervision   
 
4.1.1  
3.2.1. In pursuit of financial market stability, should central banks go 
beyond liquidity provision (overnight and as lenders of last resort) and 
be involved in micro-prudential supervision of banks? How? 
 Yes 64 62 66  No 29 31 28  N/A 7 8 7 
Number of participants 42 13 29 
3.2.2. When micro-prudential supervision is not part of the mandate of 
the central bank, should the latter be in close contact with the bank's 
supervisor? 
 Yes 97 100 95  No 0 0 0  N/A 3 0 5 
Number of participants 33 11 22 
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If yes, how? Solutions cited :     regular meetings 7 2 5 interlocking directorship 6 3 3 data sharing  3 1 2 common workshops and research findings sharing 2 0 2 advisory opinion of Central Bank 1 0 1 information sharing 9 8 1 other comments 5 2 3
3.2.3. Do you believe that those countries where the central bank is 
involved in prudential oversight fared better during the crisis? 
 Yes 40 55 32 No 50 27 63 N/A 10 18 5
Number of participants 30 11 19
3.3. Macroprudential supervision  
3.3.1. Should the Central Bank play an important role in 
macroprudential supervision? 
 Yes 88 86 89 No 7 0 11 N/A 5 14 0
Number of participants 41 14 27
3.3.2. If yes, would you favour a systemic risk council, presided over 
by the ECB, for the euro zone, as described in the Larosière report? 
 Yes 70 60 75 No 23 20 25 N/A 7 20 0
Number of participants 30 10 20
3.4. Articulation between micro and macro-prudential   
3.4.1. Stress tests: Are bank ‘stress tests’ the most promising way to 
join the macro- and micro prudential perspectives to create a stronger 
supervisory framework? 
 best solution 29 38 24 good but not the best 59 54 62 bad solution 9 8 10 N/A 3 0 5
Number of participants 34 13 21
3.4.2. Should micro-prudential and macro-prudential regulation be 
done by separate agencies? Should central banks be in charge of 
systemic oversight while specialized agencies deal with institution-
specific supervision? 
 Separation between micro- and macroprudential 45 42 46 No separation, only one agency 38 33 39 N/A 18 25 14
Number of participants 40 12 28
3.5. Systemic risk and moral hazard   
3.5.1. To assure both monetary stability and financial stability, do 
central banks need more powers? 
 Yes 55 54 56 No 32 31 32 N/A 13 15 12
Number of participants 38 13 25
Is there a risk such powers will have a negative impact on the conduct 
of monetary policy? 
 Yes 53 62 48 No 39 31 43 N/A 8 8 9
Number of participants 36 13 23
3.5.2. If central banks are to play a key role in dealing with systemic 
risk when applying a more macro-prudential approach, do you think 
they also need to have closer oversight of systemically significant 
institutions? 
 Yes 81 86 77 No 19 14 23 N/A 0 0 0
Number of participants 36 14 22
3.5.3. Conversely, did central banks create moral hazard by putting 
too much focus on systemically-important institutions? 
 Yes 52 38 60 No 48 62 40 N/A 0 0 0
Number of participants 33 13 20
3.5.4. Should Governments play a leading role in crisis resolution? 
Should they declare insolvent companies with weak capital or investor 
confidence, replace managers, remove the bad assets and require 
shareholders to take losses? 
 Yes 77 77 77 No 23 23 23 N/A 0 0 0
Number of participants 35 13 22
If yes, how? Solutions mentioned: Governments should…     declare insolvent companies with weak capital  12 4 8 replace managers 8 2 6 remove the bad assets 6 2 4 require shareholders to take losses 10 3 7 advise but do not manage directly 2 0 2
3.6. Europe   
3.6.1. Do the ‘systemic risks’ revealed by the financial crisis highlight 
the need for a new supervisory framework in Europe to assess 
financial stability risks as well as policing individual banks? 
 Yes 83 70 89 No 14 20 11 N/A 3 10 0
Number of participants 29 10 19
3.6.2 Is it a good thing that the ECB has been granted macro-
prudential supervisory prerogatives? 
 Yes 77 73 80 No 6 0 10 N/A 16 27 10
Number of participants 31 11 20
3.6.3. Do you see the new European Union system (one EU-wide 
body to look for systemic risk and a second body - comprising 
national regulators and three new EU regulators for the securities, 
banking and insurance-and-pension sectors - to examine individual 
companies) as a ‘first best’ solution? 
 Yes 41 40 41 No 50 50 50 N/A 9 10 9
Number of participants 32 10 22
4. Monetary Policy : channels/strategy/tools    
4.1. Channels   
4.1.1. Does the promise by central banks to deliver price stability in 
the medium term offer a crucial element in confidence?  
 Yes 95 93 96 No 5 7 4 N/A 0 0 0
Number of participants 37 14 23
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Is a change in the quantitative definition of price stability currently 
used a necessity? 
 Yes 32 14 45 No 68 86 55 N/A 0 0 0
Number of participants 34 14 20
4.1.2. Monetary policy and risk taking by financial intermediaries are 
linked (RTC: risk taking channel). In recent years, has this risk-taking 
channel become a major monetary policy transmission mechanism? 
 Yes 59 54 63 No 28 38 21 N/A 13 8 16
Number of participants 32 13 19
4.2. Strategy   
4.2.1. After the crisis, should the inflation targeting strategy, the ECB 
and Fed strategies be revised?  
 Yes 56 8 79 No 42 83 21 N/A 3 8 0
Number of participants 36 12 24
Along which lines? Solutions cited :    
 financial asset prices targeting 9 0 9
 real estate asset prices targeting 5 1 4
 more flexible strategy giving more importance to output 3 0 3
 to raise the inflation target at 4% 3 0 3
 to give importance to credit development 3 0 3
 to ensure Government solvency  1 0 1
 to take into account global and domestic imbalances 1 0 1
4.2.2. Could price-level targeting be an improvement over inflation 
targeting? 
 Yes 19 0 29 No 65 85 54 N/A 16 15 17
Number of participants 37 13 24
4.3. ‘Zero lower bound’ and exit strategy 
4.3.1. Did unconventional monetary policy solve the ‘zero lower 
bound’ issue? 
 Yes 49 29 62 No 31 43 24 N/A 20 29 14
Number of participants 35 14 21
4.3.2. Do you think the current low level of interest rates is fuelling 
too strong a price rise in other asset classes? 
 Yes 63 54 68 No 34 38 32 N/A 0 0 0
Number of participants 35 13 22
4.3.3. Do non-conventional measures and their lagged effects raise 
concerns over price stability of goods and services in the medium/long 
term?  
 Yes 37 50 31 No 58 42 65 N/A 5 8 4
Number of participants 38 12 26
… Over assets prices bubbles?  Yes 34 50 27 No 63 50 68 N/A 3 0 5
Number of participants 32 10 22
4.3.4. Would a transitory increase in the quantitative definition of 
price stability currently used by most central banks be useful to 
facilitate the exit strategy? 
 Yes 29 8 39 No 63 83 52 N/A 9 8 9
Number of participants 35 12 23
4.4. Asset prices 
4.4.1. Should the central bank key interest rate respond to asset price 
bubbles and credit booms? 
 Yes 63 77 57 No 34 23 39 N/A 2 0 4
  Number of participants 41 13 28 Number of mentions of ‘the interest rate is a blunt tool’ 5 2 3
4.4.2. Should a central bank choose the lowest interest rate consistent 
with its definition of price stability? Or choose a higher rate in the 
presence of a bubble? Or other instruments? 
 the lowest interest rate consistent with its definition of 
price stability 
55 80 42
 No 45 20 58 N/A 0 0 0
Number of participants 29 10 19 higher rate in the presence of a bubble 57 80 44 No 39 10 56 N/A 4 10 0
Number of participants 28 10 18
Number of citations :   both (!) 6 6 0 Other instruments 11 3 8
 – regulatory measures 4 1 3
4.4.3. Can monetary policy tame credit cycles?   Yes 67 50 75 No 33 50 25 N/A 0 0 0
Number of participants 30 10 20
Are instruments such as transitory tighter collateral standards and 
more stringent banking prudential ratios more adequate? 
 Yes 61 75 53 No 35 25 40 N/A 4 0 7
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5. International policies     
5.1. Will formulating monetary policy become a more chaotic 
process, with sharp differences between national approaches?  
 Yes 49 42 52 No 49 58 44 N/A 3 0 4
Number of participants 37 12 25
Is there a risk of mutual inconsistency in policy frameworks?  Yes 41 17 52 No 57 83 44 N/A 3 0 4
Number of participants 37 12 25
Is currency chaos a risk?  Yes 42 17 54 No 53 75 42 N/A 5 8 4
Number of participants 38 12 26
5.2. Should major central banks take into account the impact of their 
interest rate decisions on global liquidity? 
 Yes 69 82 62 No 25 18 29 N/A 6 0 10
Number of participants 32 11 21
5.3. In what circumstances are coordinated interventions by major 
central banks on the forex market desirable? 
 Never 22 22 22 Regularly 11 0 17 Rarely, except in times of extreme volatility 67 78 61
Number of participants 27 9 18 Number of mentions of ‘only in case of consensus’ 3 1 2
5.4. As many asset prices tend to correlate globally, would central 
banks' interventions to try pricking a bubble be more effective and/or 
less costly if they were coordinated? 
 Yes, more effective and less costly 56 50 60 No, not necessary 34 42 30 N/A 9 8 10
Number of participants 32 12 20
5.5. Should major central banks coordinate their action as lenders of 
last resort? 
 Yes 84 92 80 No 16 8 20
Number of participants 32 12 20
Number of mentions   Political obstacles 5 0 5 Institutional obstacles 3 0 3
6. The science and the art of central banking     
6.1. Macroeconomics 
6.1.1. Do you agree with Paul Volcker’s following statement: 
« I’m not aware of any large contribution that economic science 
has made to central banking in the last 50 years or so »? 
 Agree with Paul Volker 31 17 40 Disagree with Paul Volker 69 83 60 N/A 0 0 0
Number of participants 32 12 20
6.1.2. Is the financial crisis due to the failure of modern 
macroeconomics? 
 Yes 36 0 55 No 61 100 41 N/A 3 0 5
Number of participants 33 11 22
Is the economic crisis a crisis of economic theory?  Yes 34 0 56 No 66 100 44 N/A 0 0 0
Number of participants 29 11 18
6.2.  Models and their use 
6.2.1. Are ‘Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models’ used by 
central banks and economists fundamentally flawed? 
 Yes 45 18 59 No, it is useful 52 82 36 N/A 3 0 5
Number of participants 33 11 22
6.2.2. Are economic forecasting models used by central banks useless 
as they cannot capture financial shocks and bubbles?  
 Yes 31 17 38 No, it is useful 64 75 58 N/A 6 8 4
Number of participants 36 12 24
Should central banks accompany their model-based economic 
forecasts with an analysis of monetary and financial conditions? 
 Yes 89 92 87 No 6 0 9 N/A 6 8 4
Number of participants 35 12 23
6.3. Rational expectations and financial markets efficiency 
6.3.1. In economic modelling, must the assumption of animal spirits 
replace that of rational expectations? 
 Yes 33 18 41 No 55 55 55 N/A 12 27 5
Number of participants 33 11 22
6.3.2. Should the entire efficient markets framework be jettisoned?  Yes 48 40 52
  No, despite its limitations 48 50 48
  N/A 3 10 0
 Number of participants 31 10 21
6.4. Art versus science 
6.4.1. At the end of the day, do you think central banking will 
continue to be more art than science? 
 An art  A science 50 3 300 605
  An art help by science 47 70 35
  N/A 0 0 0
 Number of participants 30 10 20
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